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DFG Research Center (SFB) “From Heterogeneities to Inequalities” 
 
Whether fat or thin, male or female, young or old – people are different. Alongside their physi-
cal features, they also differ in terms of nationality and ethnicity; in their cultural preferences, 
lifestyles, attitudes, orientations, and philosophies; in their competencies, qualifications, and 
traits; and in their professions. But how do such heterogeneities lead to social inequalities? 
What are the social mechanisms that underlie this process? These are the questions pursued 
by the DFG Research Center (Sonderforschungsbereich (SFB)) “From Heterogeneities to 
Inequalities” at Bielefeld University, which was approved by the German Research 
Foundation (DFG) as “SFB 882” on May 25, 2011. 
In the social sciences, research on inequality is dispersed across different research fields 
such as education, the labor market, equality, migration, health, or gender. One goal of the 
SFB is to integrate these fields, searching for common mechanisms in the emergence of 
inequality that can be compiled into a typology. More than fifty senior and junior researchers 
and the Bielefeld University Library are involved in the SFB. Along with sociologists, it brings 
together scholars from the Bielefeld University faculties of Business Administration and 
Economics, Educational Science, Health Science, and Law, as well as from the German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin and the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. In 
addition to carrying out research, the SFB is concerned to nurture new academic talent, and 
therefore provides doctoral training in its own integrated Research Training Group. A data 
infrastructure project has also been launched to archive, prepare, and disseminate the data 
gathered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                       
      
 
 
 
 
 
Research Project B4 “Companies and Inequality: The Synchronic and Diachronic 
Inequality Effects of Temporary Layoffs (Recalls)” 
 
Project B4 studies discontinuous employment in the context of employing organizations and 
households. First, it analyzes how and why flexible employment relationships arise from 
heterogeneous individual and organizational characteristics and preferences. Second, it 
examines the impact of interrupted membership in employing organizations upon inequality 
over time. Thus, different mechanisms that give rise to inequality (exclusion/inclusion, 
hierarchization, exploitation, and opportunity hoarding) are analyzed in more detail using a 
mixed-method design.  
During the initial funding period, the project concentrates on “recalls” that can be 
characterized as discontinuous employment relationships with an interrupted membership in 
the same employing organization, i.e., when employees leave a company and are re-
contracted after some time. Research on labor market flexibility and organizational 
boundaries mainly ignores this longitudinal form of atypical work. Our secondary analysis of 
the Linked Employer-Employee Data from the IAB shows that about 20% of new hires in a 
firm are recalls. Analyzing the German Socio-Economic Panel we additionally find that 10% of 
all people who changed a job during the last year are recalled. The analysis provides new 
insights into flexible work and discontinuous employment, the blurring of organizational 
boundaries, and mechanisms that generate inequality within organizations.  
The mixed-method design combines qualitative and quantitative approaches as well as 
secondary analysis and field research. First, secondary analyses of the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and data from the German Institute for Employment Research 
(SIAB, BHP, and LIAB) aim to deliver results on individual and operational determinants of 
recalls and their consequences. Second, expert interviews within companies and a 
combination of narrative and semi-structured interviews with recalled employees are 
conducted to gain further insights into their rationale, appraisals, and practices. Information 
about recalls, individuals, and households included in the SOEP is used to obtain access to 
recalled employees within different contrast groups. A similar strategy is used for the expert 
interviews as sampling is based on information about the firm-specific use of recalls that is 
provided by the IAB’s Establishment History Panel (BHP). The third component is a 
standardized telephone survey of employees that will be linked with information about 
employers in the IAB’s Linked Employer-Employee Dataset (LIAB). This is used to analyze 
the statistical effect of different determinants and outcomes of recalls which have been 
discovered during the qualitative research. 
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1. Introduction 
In the debate on heterogeneous employment relationships, one particular strategy for handling 
fluctuations in labor requirements is often ignored: the temporary layoff of employees and 
their subsequent re-employment by the same employer. This is known as a recall. Thus, a 
recall can be described as a specific type of discontinuous employment relationship which is 
characterized by an interrupted membership in the same employing organization. This new 
conceptual perspective on recalls can provide new insights into flexibilization of labor mar-
kets and conditions, longitudinal forms of atypical work, its determinants, and outcomes. The 
present article focuses on analyzing what individual characteristics determine recalls and ex-
plaining the underlying mechanisms. Here, three mechanisms have been identified: “exclu-
sion,” “inclusion,” and “exploitation.” The article will first show how these mechanisms in-
teract to generate recalls. Second, transaction cost theory will be applied to explain why this is 
the case and so individual determinants of recalls can be derived on the basis of this. In re-
spect to labor market research, this aims to explain recalls as a specific discontinuous em-
ployment relationship – and to examine their consequences in further research. With regard to 
social stratification, this analysis is conducted within the broader framework of a research 
project at the Collaborative Research Center 882 and paves the way for further research to 
identify mechanisms for inequality production. 
In empirical research to date that addresses recalls, the focus has been on analyzing unem-
ployment duration (see, for example, Katz/Meyer 1990; Nivorozhkin 2008; Böheim 2006; 
Jensen/Svarer 2003). Articles deal mainly with the question of whether unemployment dura-
tion differs for employees who return to their former employer in contrast to those who join a 
new employing organization – sometimes people who leave the labor market are seen as a 
third or alternative comparison group. Although this research shows that recalls are important 
quantitatively, the findings have not encouraged work and labor relations sociologists to ana-
lyze recalls as an employment relationship or a specific flexibility strategy used by compa-
nies. If recalls are seen in this light, they become more than just a means of exiting unem-
ployment that can be analyzed in a competing risk model. Seeing recalls as a special form of 
atypical or flexible work initially triggers the research question of why employers and em-
ployees enter into such an employment relationship. By accentuating recalls as a form of dis-
continuous employment, we expect to be able to expand the way in which researchers exam-
ine recalls and, therefore, to discover mechanisms that drive discontinuous employment and 
flexible work or explain the consequences of these for example, on individual lives, living 
arrangements, employment policies, working conditions, operational profits, and security sys-
tems. Neglecting this discontinuous employment relationship could mean that our view of 
internal labor markets is limited, or that important interactions between the labor market, so-
cial security policies, and family social support or between the various mechanisms that give 
rise to inequality are not investigated. Furthermore, a longitudinal type of flexible work is 
ignored that potentially results from both an abuse of power on the part of employers and de-
mands for flexibility to combine family and job-related commitments on the part of employ-
ees. 
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Referring to this broader research agenda, the focus of this article is on analyzing what indi-
vidual characteristics determine recalls and explaining the underlying mechanisms. To model 
the decision process, recalls are assumed to be driven by decisions on exclusion and re-
inclusion taken by employers and employees. Accordingly, it is essential to examine what 
kind of people are dismissed and recalled by an employer. Furthermore, employees’ rationale 
in specific household situations have to be taken into account. To investigate the occurrence 
of temporary layoffs, mechanisms that generate recalls have to be identified first. It will then 
be argued why employers and employees use recalls, with reference to transaction costs theo-
ry. Finally, hypotheses about individual determinants of recalls will be derived and tested em-
pirically. 
 
2. Transaction Cost Theory and Decisions on Recalls  
The decision process that results in recalls is quite complex. First, the rationale of both em-
ployers and employees has to be analyzed. Additionally, employment decisions of wage earn-
ers are influenced by resources and commitments in the household. Second, recalls are driven 
by decisions on exclusion and re-inclusion taken by employers and employees. This second 
aspect complicates the underlying decision-making process considerably because characteris-
tics determining exclusion and those affecting inclusion may be different or have a contrary 
effect. For example, a company normally wants to exclude people who are less important to 
them, but include those who are of interest for them. At the same time, employees who have 
been laid off or voluntarily left a company might not wish to come back again. In order to 
analyze this complex decision-making process, first, the mechanisms that generate recalls are 
characterized as “excluding inclusion” and exploitation. Then employers’ and employees’ 
rationale behind these recall-generating mechanisms are derived from transaction cost theory.  
 
2.1 Recalls and the Mechanism of “Excluding Inclusion”  
Exclusion divides outsiders from insiders, stands for membership boundaries and closure (see 
Therborn 2006: 12ff.). This means preventing access to non-members or debarring former 
members from the in-group. In French and wider European discussions, exclusion is often 
addressed as a question of participation, for instance, in the labor market, in prosperity, in 
certain organizations or groups (see Castel 1991; Paugam 1996). Looking at social inequality 
in terms of “exclusion” implies a dichotomous logic without consideration of graded differ-
ences: people are either members or not, i.e., they are either in or out.  
While Therborn describes “exclusion” as an inequality mechanism, he sees “inclusion” as an 
equality mechanism that gives entitlements to former outsiders. In contrast to exclusion, in the 
view of the authors, the level of inclusion could be seen to be gradually differentiated if the 
in-group is structured hierarchically. In this case, members have different positions, rights, 
and rewards. By including staff, an employer does not only decide on membership in general, 
but also decides on different kinds of membership that do not provide equal access to oppor-
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tunity structures. In our view, inclusion in such an organizational context can be characterized 
as a mechanism that provides equality with respect to membership but may generate inequali-
ty relating to different membership entitlements or characteristics. 
In the context of recalls, exclusion and inclusion occur successively. In the first instance, staff 
members are excluded from an employing organization as a result of layoffs or termination of 
contractual entitlements in connection with continuing employment. Subsequently, excluded 
members are included again and thus regain their membership rights and benefits. On the ba-
sis of this interaction of exclusion and further inclusion, the authors call this process “exclud-
ing inclusion.” This means that people are finally included, but former exclusion indicates that 
they are not as irreplaceable as employees who have been continuous members. Whether this 
has an inequality-generating effect on rewards will be a subject of further research. 
The focus of the present article is on determinants that drive excluding inclusion and thus 
generate recalls. The companies’ need to reduce their personnel temporarily or the employees’ 
willingness and financial means to quit their job for a certain time and to wait for re-
employment are assumed to determine recalls. Before a more detailed analysis of which em-
ployees enter into this discontinuous employment relationship, the rationale of employers and 
employees that is behind this recall-generating mechanism are derived from transaction cost 
theory (see Williamson 1981, 1985, 1991; Picot/Dietl 1990; Nicita/Rizzolli 2012: 162). 
 
Transaction Costs and Their Effect on “Excluding Inclusion”  
From an employer’s perspective, it is clear that layoffs or terminations of temporary employ-
ment relationships immediately reduce labor costs. This is not specific to recalls. The great 
benefit of recalls becomes apparent when re-employment and transaction costs are consid-
ered. While excluding employees means cost reduction, the opposite applies when new people 
are hired. Compared to matching processes for recruiting people who are not personally 
known to the employer, re-employing former employees reduces ex-ante and ex-post transac-
tion costs. From an employee’s perspective, exclusion increases his or her financial costs 
while further re-inclusion is not guaranteed. Therefore, it is less likely that exclusion is the 
employee’s own choice. Although exclusion might be beneficial for other purposes such as 
child care, a sabbatical, further education, or leisure activities, it is assumed that the employee 
would prefer other options not resulting in the loss of any binding rights laid down in em-
ployment contracts, e.g., part-time work, unpaid leave, leave financed through working time 
accounts and adjusted wages. Nevertheless, being re-employed by the same company is ad-
vantageous as it also reduces employees’ transaction costs.  
To begin with, placement of employees is less risky and less costly since employers already 
have reliable information about employees’ abilities, performance, and personality. Thus, the 
problem of job applicants’ hidden characteristics, which is discussed in principal-agent ap-
proaches (see Spremann 1987), does not occur or is diminished in the case of recalls because 
the employer (principal) is informed about the former employee (agent) before contracting 
him/her again. Consequently, screening costs fall to zero and the problem of adverse selection 
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is nevertheless alleviated. From the employees’ perspective, the arguments are similar: they 
are familiar with the work processes, social context, and implicit requirements regarding their 
job performance. Therefore, entering into a recall employment relationship is less risky and 
less costly as they have reliable information about working conditions, employers’ demands, 
and their reciprocal rewards. Uncertainty in respect to (dis)advantageous aspects is limited 
and employees know how to behave in the work context in order to avoid or manage disad-
vantageous aspects and to profit from other aspects. Accordingly, there is no need for them to 
screen working conditions and employers’ hidden characteristics if they return to their former 
employing organization. 
Furthermore, searching for suitable staff or jobs and contacting the appropriate people is con-
siderably easier if the relevant contact information is immediately available. In addition, ne-
gotiations on contractual relations are facilitated because both contracting partners are well 
informed and resume cooperation on the basis of their past experiences with one another. In a 
sense, their willingness to return to their former employment relationship can also be inter-
preted as cooperation rather than opportunism – especially if neither party has detected oppor-
tunistic behavior in the other when previously working together. Indeed, the employer (prin-
cipal) could assume that the job applicant’s (agent’s) decision to return indicates his/her hid-
den interests are in support of cooperation. Consequently, further agency costs for monitoring 
can be lowered.  
In summary, both ex-ante transaction costs (search and information costs, bargaining costs) 
and ex-post transaction costs (enforcement costs, cost of re-negotiation) are reduced consider-
ably in comparison to vacancies that are filled with completely new and therefore unknown 
individuals or, for the job applicant, employment contracts with an unknown employer. It is 
assumed that re-employment limits asymmetric information concerning hidden characteristics 
and hidden actions, opportunism, and thus uncertainty. Hence, both employers and employees 
decide on re-contracting in less complex and less uncertain situations.  
In conclusion, the rationale of employers and employees can be summarized as follows: com-
panies save wage expenditures due to layoffs and terminations of employment contracts; re-
employment lowers follow-up costs of dismissals that arise when labor demands increase and 
new appointments become necessary. In the employers’ perspective, the specific benefit of 
recalls can be seen in reducing wage-related expenditure in cases of decreasing and increasing 
labor requirements. It can be assumed that these aspects facilitate companies’ decisions in 
favor of both exclusion and re-inclusion. For employees, the situation is different: exclusion 
increases their financial costs, and further re-inclusion is not guaranteed, although family so-
cial support or welfare subsidies may compensate the loss for a short period of time. In con-
trast, re-inclusion has a cost-reducing effect as it minimizes transaction costs that would be 
higher if the employee entered into an employment relationship with a previously unknown 
employer. Therefore, it is expected to be in an employee’s interest to stay included or consider 
re-inclusion. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the financial risks are not redistributed 
equally. 
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Human Asset Specificity and its Effect on “Excluding Inclusion”  
Transaction cost theory refers to human capital in general and also in particular. The concept 
of “human asset specificity,” which derives from transaction cost theory (see Williamson 
1975, 1981: 555, 1985), deals with the specificity or transferability of all types of human capi-
tal (e.g., cognitive and practical skills, knowledge, social and personality attributes, and expe-
rience) that enables a person to perform a job. If human asset specificity is high, dependency 
between contractual partners increases. This means that investments that have been made in 
favor of a particular transaction lose value if they are used in another transaction. Therefore, 
employment relationships that are characterized by high human asset specificity benefit from 
a continuing relationship that at least reduces sunk costs for employers and employees. 
From an employer’s perspective, benefits that derive from re-employment can be seen in var-
ious ways: former employees possess general human capital that is needed in the company 
and have also gained company-specific knowledge through prior on-the-job training or other 
vocational education. Uncertainty with respect to their abilities and performance is lessened. 
However, it must be taken into account that this cost-reducing effect may decrease if the time 
between the two employment relationships increases and deskilling arises (see Mohr 2001). 
Moreover, employers save time and the financial costs of new investment that would be nec-
essary if people they do not know are contracted instead of former personnel. Finally, in the 
case of re-employment, transaction-specific investments made previously remain in the com-
pany and cannot benefit competing companies.  
From an employee’s perspective, benefits are similar: he or she possesses the type of human 
capital that is needed and is therefore adequately rewarded in their former employing organi-
zation. If they are looking for alternative employment that is comparable to their former work, 
this means finding another employer who has similar needs for human capital and is willing 
to honor employees’ former investments in their human capital. Depending on their type of 
human capital and in particular its asset specificity, this can be more or less difficult. If the 
asset specificity of their human capital is high, it is less likely to find adequate alternatives, 
and the job search becomes more complicated. Thus, contracting with another employer often 
causes loss of former investments in human capital (see Hamermesh 1987). Furthermore, con-
tracting may involve adjustments of living and working conditions, for example, moving to 
another region or commuting. Therefore, waiting for re-employment may be the best option as 
long as the financial situation of the household (including wage subsidies) allows this course 
of action. Moreover, a new job requires new investments in human capital in order to adapt an 
employee’s job performance to the new working conditions and job demands. As outlined 
above, uncertainty is higher when a person starts working for a new company, and this im-
plies that future investments probably will not pay off. Consequently, if quasi rents are high, 
sunk costs can be minimized by waiting for re-employment. Nevertheless, the crucial factor 
may be the unemployment duration: if employees wait too long to find alternative employ-
ment, they reduce their chances of finding an appropriate position. For example, it becomes 
more likely they have to accept some loss in their future income (see Gangl 2004, 2006; Ar-
ranz et al. 2005). Thus, employees’ decisions on recalls refer to whether they are willing and 
able to wait for re-employment and, additionally, how long this is expected to be beneficial in 
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terms of financial aspects, investments in human capital, deskilling, and inclusion in the labor 
market.  
In summary, if human asset specificity is high, both employers and employees will try to con-
tinue their employment relationship: either they do not separate and employees stay included 
in the employing organization or both try to draw up a contract again. In the former case, hu-
man asset specificity prevents exclusion, and in the latter, it drives re-inclusion. From an em-
ployer’s perspective, recalls help to maintain some human capital via re-inclusion despite 
former exclusion. This reduces follow-up costs that result from excluding human capital 
which is needed in the company – independent of its asset specificity. Although saving gen-
eral human capital is of interest to employers, human asset specificity can increase a compa-
ny’s and an employee’s interest in re-inclusion to a larger degree. The cost-reducing effects of 
recalls on future investments in human capital and on amortization of former investments on 
both sides are assumed to affect the mechanism of excluding inclusion that generates recalls. 
However, it is important to note that these aspects drive inclusion: they increase the interest in 
re-inclusion. Additionally, they protect people to a certain extent against exclusion – an effect 
that will be explored in more detail below when changing conditions of asymmetric depend-
ence are discussed.  
 
2.2 Recalls and the Mechanism of “Exploitation” 
Tilly defines exploitation as an inequality-generating mechanism when “… persons who con-
trol a resource a) enlist the effort of others in production of value by means of that resource, 
but b) exclude others from the full value added by their effort.” (Tilly 2000: 782; see also Til-
ly 1998). Similarly, this mechanism is characterized by Therborn (2006: 12): “… A derives 
his inequality over B because of the valuable items that B provides him with. (…) Exploita-
tion involves a categorical division between some superior and some inferior people, whereby 
the former unilaterally or asymmetrically extract values from the latter.” Additionally, Ther-
born (2006: 14) states that exploitation is based on polarized power relations and asymmetric 
dependence and assumes that the corresponding equality mechanism is “redistribution.” 
With respect to employment relationships, employers and employees may not be equally 
powerful regarding contract negotiations. Transaction cost theory deals with these power rela-
tions in terms of bargaining power and hold-up strategies (see Klein 1980). The hold-up prob-
lem means that one person may gain bargaining power using other people’s investments and 
decide to demand more profit than the other. Therefore, the party with the greater bargaining 
power asymmetrically divides the costs and benefits of transactions. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that increased asymmetric dependence improves the incentive to secure quasi rents 
through opportunistic behavior. Although it is formulated differently, this is exactly how ex-
ploitation can be defined. In order to analyze companies’ bargaining power in more detail, it 
is first necessary to characterize this and describe its effect on exploitation as a mechanism to 
generate recalls. Then, further determinants will be considered that may alter companies’ bar-
gaining power and so change asymmetric dependence and its effect on exploitation and re-
calls.  
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Employer’s Bargaining Power and Its Effect on Exploitation with Regard to Recalls 
Companies’ bargaining power is based on their potential to offer jobs and the related rewards 
that are needed by a dependent working population. Companies’ decisions determine whether 
dismissals or placements are necessary and how people will be rewarded. The fact that a 
workforce depends on companies’ providing employment means firms may be in a position to 
convince or “oblige” employees to wait for re-employment. In other words, employers may 
use their bargaining power for their own interests and encourage people to make investments 
that might never pay off. For instance, employees and their families invest time and money 
waiting for re-employment; unemployment benefits, if received, are less than wages previous-
ly earned so in real terms people have less money than when they were employed. Further-
more, they bear the financial risk of not being re-employed and of having waited too long to 
find another job. In the case of recalls, exploitation means that employers use peoples’ de-
pendency and investments during unemployment to reduce labor-related costs without offer-
ing them adequate compensation. To reformulate it using Therborn’s equality mechanism: if 
the risks the employee bears and the advantages the company has as a result of reduction of 
labor costs are not redistributed equally, the latter is understood to exploit the former.  
The special characteristic of recalls that makes this type of exploitation easy is established by 
means of incomplete contracts – or to be precise, the lack of a contract that gives legal rights 
to former employees during unemployment. As former personnel are no longer able to make 
legally binding claims against a company upon termination of an employment contract, they 
may only rely on the employer’s prestige, cooperative interests, or good will as well as chang-
ing labor market conditions. If one of these presumptions does not apply, people who are en-
couraged to or have to wait for re-employment for other reasons are essentially being exploit-
ed. The same applies if employees are included in the organizational context again, but com-
pensation is below the level of costs they invested during unemployment or lost in respect to 
future opportunity structures. In view of all these arguments, it is very likely that employees 
are exploited in some way and that recalls are generated by exploitation.  
 
Determinants of Changing Asymmetric Dependence and its Effect on Recalls  
While an employer may often be the superior partner who decides on exclusion, inclusion, 
and distribution of rewards, employees also have bargaining power. Companies rely on work-
ers’ cooperation and their human capital and, in addition, labor regulations also protect the 
workforce. Thus, asymmetric dependence in an employer’s favor may be reduced by these 
factors.  
First, exploitation is limited due to a lack of total control of employees’ behavior. If compa-
nies increasingly abuse asymmetric dependence and behave too opportunistically, this im-
proves the employee’s incentive to also behave opportunistically. If he/she is re-included, 
he/she may adjust performance to what he/she assumes to be fair. People who remain exclud-
ed may also ruin the prestige of their former employer. Hence, overly opportunistic behavior 
can be risky for a company – even if asymmetric dependence makes it possible in principle.  
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Second, employees’ bargaining power is increased by their value as human capital. Referring 
to the preceding theoretical considerations on human capital, it may be too costly for the 
company to dismiss people with high human asset specificity as former investments may not 
pay off. Furthermore, those with high human capital that is asset unspecific can often easily 
find alternative jobs with another company. Consequently, it is riskier to lay them off than 
others with lower human capital as it is less likely that they will wait for re-employment. 
Thus, it becomes more likely that employers cannot profit from these workers’ cost-efficient 
return to their organization. Overall, increasing human capital – whether asset specific or not 
– gives bargaining power to employees as long as its company-specific relevance grows. On 
the basis of these considerations, people with the necessary human capital are less likely to be 
laid off, which consequently implies lower recall rates as the excluding precondition of recalls 
is eliminated. In contrast, people with low human capital may be more likely to be dismissed 
and, equally, to be completely dispensable. Accordingly, an inverted U-shaped effect of hu-
man capital on recalls can be expected. This leads to the assumption that recalls are mostly 
offered to people with medium human capital. The underlying reason can be seen in employ-
ees’ bargaining power that protects people with highly valued human capital to a degree 
against exclusion and increases the opportunities of being included for people with medium 
human capital. Accordingly, the risk of being exploited by a company is reduced by increas-
ing company-specific relevance of human capital. This is because asymmetric dependence 
changes in the favor of employees so that companies have less reason to act opportunistically. 
Third, labor regulations restrict the ability to fire people, thus reducing employers’ power. 
Nevertheless, German labor legislation has changed since the 1980s and one of its effects has 
been an increase in fixed-term contracts (see Hagen 2004: 23; Keller/Seifert 2004: 242f). As 
these facilitate termination of employment relationships, they give bargaining power to em-
ployers and increase asymmetric dependence in their favor. Accordingly, companies that use 
fixed-term contracts, legally, have more opportunity to use recalls and to exploit workers’ 
investments during periods of unemployment.  
 
Reduced Exploitation via Beneficial Aspects of Recalls   
As argued above, recalls are beneficial with respect to transaction costs and investments in 
human capital provided that re-employment takes place. Additionally, waiting for a recall can 
be advantageous if employees are less flexible in changing their jobs and employing organiza-
tion and have a higher need for geographical stability. When a new employment relationship 
is entered into, flexibility is needed to adjust to new working and living contexts. If employ-
ees do not want to move or commute, they avoid investments in geographical mobility (see 
Mertens/Haas 2006) that can be measured in monetary and non-monetary costs, for instance, a 
(temporary) separation from their partner and children, their friends and relatives, their former 
living conditions, and property. If this flexibility is restricted, a recall can be seen as an ad-
vantage and may not (or to a lesser extent) be seen as an abuse of bargaining power by em-
ployers.  
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Empirical studies have shown that German employees tend to avoid the aforementioned mo-
bility costs for as long as possible (see Windzio 2004; Mertens and Haas 2006), even if this 
may prolong their unemployment duration. Moreover, it has been established that unemploy-
ment benefit recipients who expect to be recalled spend less time searching for alternative 
employment and those who are not in fact recalled remain unemployed for a longer period 
than those who did not expect to be recalled (see Katz et al 1990). This leads us to two con-
clusions: on the one hand, employees believe that waiting is beneficial for them and, on the 
other hand, waiting can prove to be risky if they are not subsequently re-employed. As al-
ways, employees can only benefit from being excluded if they are actually re-employed and 
not laid off permanently. In general, waiting depends on employees’ and their families’ deci-
sion to do so, which in turn may be related to a lack of suitable alternative job opportunities 
on the labor market but is to some extent also a matter of their own personal choice. As em-
ployees decide whether and how long they will wait for re-employment, a recall is never only 
generated by exploitation.  
Moreover, exploitation and opportunistic behavior by companies are reduced to zero if the 
former staff are rewarded adequately. Empirical research shows that people who are recalled 
gain income advantages (see Anderson 1992; Groot 1990; Mavromaras 2003; Rodriguez-
Planas 2004; Burda/Mertens 2001). In this case, waiting is rewarded and proves to be better 
than accepting an alternative job offer with a lower income or reduced occupational benefits 
where seniority rights are lost and have to be worked up to (see Burda/Mertens 2001). Com-
panies use these financial incentives to motivate former staff to wait for re-employment. Nev-
ertheless, they do not support those who are laid off while they are unemployed and do not 
guarantee future re-inclusion. Therefore, the risks are not equally distributed and offering po-
tential income advantages can be seen as an integral part of a hold-up strategy. Although em-
pirical research shows that people are rewarded for having waited through positive discrimi-
nation regarding placement and income benefits, it has yet not been examined whether this 
fully compensates their costs and risk. Only if this is the case is exploitation set to zero – at 
least for those employees who are actually recalled. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
On the basis of the preceding theoretical considerations, hypotheses regarding individual de-
terminants of recalls have been derived and tested empirically.  
From an employer’s perspective, transaction costs theory suggests that recalls will only be 
offered to temporary dispensable staff. Hence, first, the employee needs to be more dispensa-
ble than others. Therefore, the first hypothesis to be tested empirically states that a recall is 
more likely if a part-time or a fixed-term contract indicates greater dispensability than a full-
time or permanent one. Moreover, fixed-term contracts facilitate exclusion and therefore re-
calls. Additionally, employees with these employment contracts may have a lesser need for 
job stability and full inclusion in employing organizations. Therefore, their willingness or 
ability to leave the company temporarily may be higher. 
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Second, a company will only recall a person if the employee’s skills and job performance are 
needed. Following the argument of temporary dispensability, the second hypothesis assumes 
an inverted u-shaped effect of human capital and hourly gross wages on the likelihood of re-
calls: It is too risky for a company to dismiss highly efficient employees who are less likely to 
wait for potential re-employment due to better job opportunities elsewhere. In contrast, em-
ployees with a low efficiency level may be completely dispensable. Overall, this leads to the 
assumption that recalls are offered to people of medium efficiency.  
From an employee’s perspective, employment decisions are strongly influenced by resources 
and commitments in the household. Whether temporary exclusion from the employing organ-
ization is predominantly an advantage or a disadvantage depends on the household context. 
Thus, the individual’s willingness and ability to wait for potential re-employment is assumed 
to vary with this. Consequently, a third hypothesis expects that a recall is less likely, the more 
the household depends on the income of the interviewee. In this case, income instabilities are 
associated with disadvantages and time without earnings has to be restricted, so waiting for a 
recall might be less feasible. Additionally, people who are married may feel more responsibil-
ity to stabilize employment conditions and may not be willing to enter into a discontinuous 
employment relationship. If this proves to be true, recalls are less likely for married employ-
ees. Nevertheless, a contrary effect is also possible: married people can rely on the support of 
their husband or wife and this may increase their willingness and ability to wait for future re-
employment and increase the likelihood of a recall.  
When entering into a new employment relationship, flexibility is needed to adjust working 
and living contexts and particularly to rearrange child care. If this flexibility is restricted due 
to younger children or home ownership, a recall could be seen as an advantage. As child care 
– especially of younger children – is still predominantly done by women, this effect should be 
stronger for women. Therefore, a fourth hypothesis states that an individual’s limited flexibil-
ity in rearranging working and living conditions is likely to increase willingness to wait for a 
recall.   
In summary, the following hypotheses are tested empirically: 
It is more likely that recalls are offered to or chosen by employees 
(1) who are more dispensable than others and have a reduced need for full inclusion in an 
employing organization. Therefore, employees with part-time and fixed-term contracts 
are more likely to be recalled. 
(2) who have a medium efficiency level because people with higher efficiency will not be 
excluded or will not wait for further re-inclusion and a lower efficiency level may 
complicate re-employment – even if employees are willing to wait for a recall. Conse-
quently, an inverted u-shaped effect of human capital and hourly gross wages on the 
likelihood of recalls is expected. 
(3) who can afford to wait for re-employment and are willing to do so. Thus, a recall is 
less likely, the more the household depends on the income of the interviewee. Addi-
tionally, the commitments of married couples may prevent or facilitate recalls and em-
pirical analysis should show which of these two effects is predominant.  
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(4) who are less flexible in rearranging working and living conditions. The higher an em-
ployee’s commitment to child care, the more likely recalls are. The same applies to 
people who own a house or an apartment.  
 
4. Data, Methods, and Variables 
The hypotheses are tested empirically using the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP). This study is conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Ber-
lin) which supports social sciences by collecting annual representative microdata on individu-
als, households, and families. Data is collected in western Germany since 1984 and in eastern 
Germany since 1990. The aim of this study is to measure stability and change in living condi-
tions by following a micro-economic and sociological approach, using both objective indica-
tors (e.g., income and employment status) and subjective perceptions of objective living con-
ditions (e.g., satisfaction and preferences). In principle, face-to-face personal interviews with 
all household members aged 16 and over are conducted. General household information is 
gained by interviewing the person who knows best about the general conditions that prevail in 
the household. This person remains the same over time in order to reduce longitudinal incon-
sistencies. Once a household is part of the sample, its members are to be surveyed every year 
until they die, move abroad, or finally refuse to be interviewed. If households or some of their 
members move within Germany, people are followed up, and those moving into an existing 
SOEP household are to be surveyed, too. Due to this sampling strategy, households and their 
members are the focus of the research, and information about employers is limited. Neverthe-
less, information about working conditions, employment contracts, and transitions in the labor 
market are provided. The sample is restricted to the dependent working population aged be-
tween 18 and 65 in private households. Moreover, only employees who have changed their 
employment are analyzed since a recall implies this change. The dataset covers the period 
from 1989 to 2010 as information about recalls is available from 1989 onwards. 
In contrast to other employment relationships that can be identified by a certain employment 
contract (e.g., part-time), recalls are not contractually laid down. Instead, they can be identi-
fied if an employee leaves a job and returns to his/her former employer after a certain period 
of time. There are studies that differentiate between seasonal and cyclical recalls (see Mavro-
maras/Rudolph 1995). In the case of seasonal recalls, employees have to be re-employed after 
three months, while for cyclical recalls, employees are recalled later. This distinction is purely 
made by definition in an attempt to examine seasonal and cyclical fluctuations of labor re-
quirements. Other studies distinguish between people receiving unemployment benefit and 
those receiving unemployment assistance (see Alba et al. 2012.). In the present study, recalls 
are not classified in more detail because of the sample size. Here, a recall only implies that 
employees return to their former employer – regardless of what happened during the time 
between these two employment contracts and the timing of re-employment. In the SOEP, em-
ployees who changed jobs are asked how they found out about this vacancy. One answer is 
“return to former employer.” This information is used to construct the dependent variable 
 
                       
                     
 
13 
 
which is a 0/1-coded variable that equals 1 if people are recalled. Thus, a binary logit regres-
sion model is used to analyze the data. It examines how the independent variables affect the 
probability of recalls. Due to the sample size, pooled data are analyzed.  
To test the first hypothesis, employee’s relative dispensability is measured by 0/1-coded vari-
ables indicating part-time and fixed-term contracts. It is assumed that both increase the likeli-
hood of recalls.  
The second hypothesis refers to employees’ efficiency level, which is operationalized by their 
human capital and hourly gross wages. Two indicators are used to measure human capital: 
first, an ordinal variable informs whether employees do not have any vocational certificate, 
obtained some type of vocational qualification, or possess an academic degree. Second, the 
time they worked for their former employer is used as an indicator for their company-specific 
human capital and human asset specificity: these are supposed to increase according to the 
time an employee has worked in a company. To calculate the hourly gross wages, the monthly 
gross income is divided by the product of the weekly working hours multiplied by 4.3. It is 
expected that all these variables have an inverted u-shaped effect on the likelihood of recalls. 
To test this empirically, tenure and hourly gross wages are also squared. If the assumed non-
linear effect is confirmed, the effect of the unsquared variables should be positive while the 
squared ones are negative. Moreover, compared to the middle category of the ordinal indica-
tor of vocational human capital, the lowest and highest category should decrease the likeli-
hood of recalls.  
The third hypothesis relies on variables that measure an employee’s ability to wait for re-
employment. Therefore, the net income of the interviewee is divided by the net income of 
his/her household. The closer this variable is to one, the more the household depends on the 
income of the interviewee, which in turn is assumed to reduce the likelihood of recalls. Infor-
mation about the marriage status of employees is 0/1-coded, but theoretically its effect is un-
clear.  
The last hypothesis refers to an employee’s flexibility in rearranging working and living con-
ditions. To measure an employee’s commitment to child care, a variable is constructed that 
combines information on whether an employee has children with information about the age of 
the youngest child. Here, it is assumed that flexibility in rearranging working and living con-
ditions increases when children get older and consequently become increasingly independent. 
Lower numbers of this variable indicate that children are younger and highly dependent on 
their parents, while higher numbers signify growing independence of the children and increas-
ing flexibility of their parents. Thus, employees whose youngest child is 18 or older are in the 
same category as employees who do not have any children. The reason for this is that the flex-
ibility level of both is assumed to be similar. As the hypothesis states that less flexibility in-
creases the likelihood of recalls, the effect of the constructed variable should be negative. 
Moreover, an interaction term of this variable with gender is added to the model in order to 
test if the effect is higher for women, whose commitment to child care is predominantly high-
er. Additionally, home ownership functions as a second indicator for reduced flexibility. This 
variable is 0/1-coded and equals 1 if the employee possesses a house or an apartment. It is 
assumed that this increases the likelihood of recalls. 
 
                       
                     
 
14 
 
To control for different conditions in various sectors, the following variables are included in 
the model. They are 0/1-coded and indicate the following sectors: agriculture, energy, mining, 
manufacturing, construction, trade, transport, bank/insurance, and services. Manufacturing is 
used as reference category as the highest number of people is in this sector.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Results 
The descriptive results in Figure 1 show that about 10% of all job changers return to a former 
employer each year. The lower amount in the period 1989 through 1998 is driven by a differ-
ent coding and cannot be interpreted as a substantial change in recall decisions: before 1999, 
each answer to the question how people found out about their job was recorded using a sepa-
rate variable that codes “yes” as 1 and everything else as a missing value. During the follow-
ing years, all answers to the same question have been stored in one variable and are coded as 
different values of the same variable.  
 
Figure 1: Percentage of Recalled Job Changers per Year 
 
Source: SOEP 1989-2010, Note: Coding changed in 1999. 
 
Recall-decisions differ according to diverse employment situations. Industries characterized 
by seasonal labor demand traditionally use more recalls than others. As Figure 2 shows, this is 
particularly true for agriculture and construction. If the entire dataset is used to calculate the 
descriptive results, 12% and 9% of all job changers in agriculture and construction, respec-
tively, return to their former employer. If the descriptive analysis is restricted to the period 
1999 through 2010 and the new coding, the amount rises to 15% and 12%. Additionally, in 
the finance and service sector, job changers are more often recalled than in other industries: 
for the entire dataset, the figures are 10% and 8%, respectively, and for the reduced dataset, 
12% and 9%. This indicates that further operational determinants and cyclical labor demands 
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also affect recall decisions (for empirical evidence and an empirical test of operational deter-
minants, see Liebig/Hense 2007; Hense 2012).  
 
Figure 2: Percentage of Recalled Job Changers by Sector 
 
Source: SOEP 1989-2010 
 
Moreover, recall decisions are assumed to be influenced by different household situations and 
individual characteristics of employees. Referring to the multivariate results of our analysis, 
this will be discussed in more detail in the following section. The descriptive results in Figure 
3 briefly show that household contexts matter. First, it can be seen that children who live in a 
household influence their parents’ recall decisions: 10% of job changers who live together 
with their partner and child(ren), and 7% of job changers who are single parents decide to 
return to their former employer. If only the new coding is used to calculate the results, the 
figures rise to 13% and 9%. In contrast, people who live alone (6% or, according to the new 
coding, 7%) or couples without children (5% or, according to the new coding, 6%) seem to be 
more flexible in rearranging living and working conditions and therefore have lower recall 
rates: either because they do not want or need to wait for a re-employment or because em-
ployers prefer to recall former employees who have a family. Second, living together with a 
spouse/partner does not have a clear effect on recall decisions because couples without chil-
dren have the lowest and those with children the highest recall rates. Thus, we cannot assume 
that cohabitating couples/spouses may pool their resources and are – in general – more able 
and willing to wait for re-employment than others. Instead, it is necessary to differentiate on 
the basis of available resources (e.g., economic situation) and demands (e.g., commitment to 
child care and spouse) in more detail as is done in the following multivariate analysis. This 
will show that recall decisions are driven by these underlying factors and that research on em-
ployment decisions may profit from considering resources and demands in the household con-
texts of employees.  
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Figure 3: Percentage of Recalled Job Changers by Household Type  
 
Source: SOEP 1989-2010 
 
5.2 Multivariate Results 
Table 1 shows the results for the multivariate analysis. They support the first hypothesis that 
recalls are offered to temporary dispensable staff: employees with part-time or fixed-term 
contracts are more likely to be recalled than people with full-time or permanent contracts. 
Additionally, these people may have a reduced need for full inclusion in an employing organ-
ization, and are more willing or able to leave the company temporarily.  
The second hypothesis refers to employees’ skills and job performance that are measured in 
terms of human capital and hourly gross wages. It can be seen that employees who do not 
have a vocational qualification or those who have an academic degree are less likely to be 
recalled than those who completed an apprenticeship and obtained a vocational qualification. 
Thus, people with medium human capital are more likely to be recalled. If tenure is used as an 
indicator for company-specific human capital, the conclusion is the same: with increasing 
tenure, being recalled becomes more likely, and the negative effect of squared tenure indicates 
an inverted u-shaped effect of human capital. Therefore, recalls are more likely for employees 
with a medium efficiency level because employees with higher efficiency will not be exclud-
ed or will not wait for re-inclusion and a lower efficiency level may complicate re-
employment. Moreover, the likelihood of a recall increases with higher hourly gross wages, 
but the squared variable does not have a significant effect. Consequently, the result of this last 
indicator does not support the second hypothesis as the expected u-shaped effect does not 
appear. Instead, hourly gross wages have a linear effect on recalls so that recalls are more 
likely to be offered to or accepted by employees with higher wages. On the one hand, this 
may be influenced by an employer’s need for flexibility in wage expenditure (see Hense 
2012), and, on the other hand, employees who receive higher wages may benefit more from 
re-employment than others – an assumption that has to be tested in future research. 
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Table 1: Individual Determinants of Recalls (Logit Regression) 
 Recalled Job Changer  
Dispensable Staff   
Part-time (ref: full-time)   .2904*** (.0741) 
fixed-term contract (ref: permanent)   .1431*** (.0317) 
Efficiency Level   
vocational qualification (ref. apprenticeship)   
no certificate  - .2980*** (.0810) 
academic degree  - .2965*** (.0711) 
tenure    .2818*** (.0231) 
tenure (squared)  - .0099*** (.0013) 
hourly gross wage    .0179** (.0057) 
hourly gross wage (squared)  - .0001 (.0001) 
Ability/Willingness to Wait    
household dependence on income  - .3837** (.1391) 
married (ref: unmarried)  - .2447*** (.0628) 
Flexibility in Rearranging Living Conditions   
commitment to child care    .0321 (.0187) 
commitment to child care*female  - .3108*** (.0240) 
female (ref: male)  1.7242*** (.1374) 
home ownership    .2080*** (.0585) 
Control Variables   
sectors (ref: manufacturing)   
agriculture    .7425*** (.2063) 
energy  - .3885 (.3162) 
mining    .1104 (.4697) 
construction    .4712*** (.0971) 
trade     .0065 (.0934) 
transport  - .1367 (.1416) 
bank, insurance  - .1707 (.1583) 
services  - .0708 (.0794) 
constant -3.3635*** (.1717) 
Pseudo R2 0.1133 
Log pseudolikelihood/ Wald chi2 (df) -6070.671/ 1213.74 (22) 
Notes:  German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) 1989-2010; pooled data; 
number of observations: 25,120 (employees who changed their job); logit 
regression with non-standardized coefficients; robust standard error in 
brackets; significance level: * pt <.05; ** pt <.01; *** pt<.001 
 
The third hypothesis assumes that an employee’s ability and willingness to wait for re-
employment affects his/her recall decision. Recalls become less likely, the more the house-
hold depends on the employee’s income. In this case, temporary exclusion from employment 
and related rewards has essential effects on the economic situation of the whole household. 
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Thus, a recall decision is influenced by the economic resources in the household: if the 
household is not able to counteract the losses in income, employees are not able to wait for re-
employment and exclusion is seen as a disadvantage. Moreover, married employees seem to 
be less willing to wait for re-employment because it is less likely for them to be recalled. This 
supports the assumption that married people feel more responsibility to stabilize employment 
conditions.  
The fourth hypothesis states that people who are less flexible regarding re-arranging working 
and living conditions are more likely to be recalled. Interestingly, the commitment to child 
care only has an effect for women: if their commitment to child care decreases, recalls be-
come less likely. Thus, recalls are more likely if women are less flexible in rearranging child 
care due to the young age of their children. In this case, recalls may be seen as an advantage 
and employees are more willing to wait for re-employment or use their exclusion from an 
employing organization to invest more time in child care. Moreover, it can be seen that in 
general women are more likely to be recalled than men: if this is driven by different prefer-
ences, their different position in the labor market or other factors have to be analyzed in more 
detail in future research. A second test for an employee’s flexibility is his/her home owner-
ship. The analysis shows that people who own an apartment or house are more likely to be 
recalled. This supports the assumption that these employees are less flexible and more willing 
to wait for a re-employment than employees who rent.  
Although branches are only added to the model to control for different employment condi-
tions, employees who work in a sector with seasonal labor demands such as agriculture and 
construction are more likely to be recalled than others if compared to the manufacturing sec-
tor. 
 
6. Discussion  
Analyzing recalls as a specific discontinuous employment relationship has proven to be bene-
ficial as it could be shown that recalls are driven by decisions on exclusion and re-inclusion 
both taken by employers and employees. A recall is generated by exclusion from an employ-
ing organization and later re-inclusion, which is called “excluding inclusion”. This article has 
focused on individual determinants of recalls and tested hypotheses derived from transaction 
cost theory: the specific characteristic of recalls is a reduction in employers’ and employees’ 
ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs in comparison to vacancies that are filled with complete-
ly unknown individuals. Additionally, recalls help to maintain or optimize human capital 
through re-inclusion and reduce follow-up costs for employers and employees that result from 
exclusion. Exclusion is assumed to be enforced by a company’s need to reduce their personnel 
temporarily or the employees’ willingness and financial means to quit their job for a certain 
time and to wait for re-employment. Therefore, employees who – from the employer’s per-
spective – are more dispensable than others are more likely to be excluded. In contrast, exclu-
sion is averted and re-inclusion is intensified by employees’ skills or bargaining power since 
highly efficient employees are less likely to be dismissed in the first place and more likely to 
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be recalled. Employees’ human capital increases an employer’s interest in re-inclusion and 
prevents exclusion and exploitation to a certain extent. From an employee’s perspective, ex-
clusion increases his or her financial costs while further re-inclusion is not guaranteed. There-
fore, it is less likely that exclusion is the employee’s own choice.  
With recalls, hold-up (exploitation) means that employers use people’s dependency and in-
vestments during unemployment to reduce labor-related costs without offering them adequate 
compensation. The special characteristic of recalls that makes this kind of exploitation possi-
ble is established through the lack of a contract during unemployment. Whether this exploita-
tion does in fact take place will be analyzed in future research. Nevertheless, the beneficial 
aspects of recalls may reduce exploitation provided that re-employment occurs. Waiting for a 
recall can be advantageous if employees are less flexible in re-arranging working and living 
conditions due to child care and home ownership. In this case, a recall may not (or to a lesser 
amount) be driven by exploitation and may not result from an abuse of bargaining power by 
employers. However, waiting for re-employment is only possible if the financial situation of 
the household allows this course of action. It could be shown that recall decisions depend on 
resources and commitments in the household, and these factors determine whether recalls are 
advantageous or disadvantageous. In general, waiting is driven by employees’ and their fami-
lies’ decisions to do so: it is to some extent a free choice, so recalls are never only generated 
by exploitation.  
Employees who are more likely to enter into a recall that can be seen as a specific discontinu-
ous employment relationship are those who work part-time, have a fixed-term contract and 
medium human capital, are able to afford to wait for re-employment due to financial resources 
in their household and are less flexible in re-arranging living and working conditions. Further 
research could compare these results with research on other types of discontinuous employ-
ment so that general determinants of discontinuous employment relationships can be derived. 
Furthermore, it can be assumed that these people form the flexible part of a company’s inter-
nal labor market. Therefore, research about internal labor markets may profit from these re-
sults. Finally, further research about exploitation and different effects of recalls is needed. The 
consequences of recalls on rewards, individual lives, and living arrangements will be exam-
ined in the next few years using a mixed-method design. Furthermore, the rationale of em-
ployers and employees are currently being analyzed in more detail using a qualitative ap-
proach. This will subsequently be used to conduct our own survey on this subject.  
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